We observe different market reactions whether firms based in emerging countries issue equity locally or abroad. This result suggests that the decision on where to issue may convey information regarding the value of the firm. Constructing indexes for market openness and information disclosure, we empirically find that the probability of issuing in international markets decreases by seven percent as the asymmetry of information between domestic and foreign investors decreases. Furthermore, the risk premium on market-to-book value estimated by Fama and French (1992) is correlated with the firm's decison on where to issue public securities. We use a switching regression model to compute the price reactions to the firm's issue decision, where the endogenous switching corresponds to the firm's decision on where to issue. Our results reveal that foreign issues are associated with lower risk premium suggesting that a firm signals high quality when issuing in international markets. Finally, we find that firms that issue both locally and abroad tend to issue earlier internationally and later in domestic markets, supporting the idea that foreign issues are associated with higher fixed costs.
Introduction
During the last decade, firms based in emerging countries have increasingly used developed markets as a vehicle to raise new capital 1 . For the same period, net portfolio investment to developing countries rose around ten-fold. 2 Increasing worldwide investment opportunities call forth the question of where is the best place for firms to raise public capital. In the present paper, we study the decision of a firm whether to issue public securities in local emerging markets or abroad. We find that as domestic markets become more transparent to outside investors, the firm's incentives to issue in international markets diminish. 3 Additionally, our results indicate that the risk premium effect on price-to-book value, as measured in Fama and French (1992) , differs according to the place of issuance; international issues present lower risk premium than domestic listings.
In this paper we merge the issue characteristics information with the stock performance data over the 1988-1998 period, comprising a comprehensive sample of 26 emerging markets. 4 We present an analytical framework that is based upon the model of Kyle (1985) in which there are information asymmetries between local and foreign investors. 5 We proxy the asymmetry of information in local emerging markets using indexes that control for investor protection, accounting standards and entry restrictions and test the analytical framework.
The empirical analysis coincide with the theoretical simulations and we find that as markets become more transparent to outside investors, the probability to issue equity in the domestic market increases. 6 Furthermore, we analyze the price reaction to the issue announcement. Our results are consistent with Fama and French (1992) in finding that price-to-book value significantly explains market returns. However, as different stock markets have multiple disclosure and listing requirements, the place on where to issue may convey information on the firm's value 7 .
We empirically model the price reaction to public issue announcement using a switching regression model where the endogenous switching is the firm's choice on where to issue. Our results reveal different "load" factors on security returns associated with the price-to-book factor, depending on where the firm issues its securities, and suggest a higher risk premium following a domestic issue announcement than after an international one.
The relevance of the place of issuance is most meaningful in emerging markets where domestic investors are likely to have better information about firms in their own countries than foreign investors. The two types of investors may therefore price securities differently.
Foreign investors are in search of high returns and portfolio diversification. Firms choose the place of issuance to maximize their market values to find the optimal balance between the asymmetric information and the risk-sharing factors. Firms perceive foreign markets as an opportunity to reach a wider range of investors and investment opportunities.
The different reactions to domestic and foreign issues we find in this paper can not be understood within the theoretical analysis of mean-variance portfolio decomposition. According to this theory, once a country liberalizes or a firm accesses the global capital markets, investors would be completely integrated in world markets. The conventional wisdom is that if investors are risk-averse and care only about the expected returns on their invested wealth and the variance of their return, they would be able to measure risk by the covariance of the return on their portfolio with that of a benchmark world portfolio. In an attempt to 6 On February 25, 2002, Louise Wilson, head of international syndicated at UBS Warburg, commenting a recent public sale of Yukos, the Russian second-largest oil company, said to the Financial Times that "improving standards in corporate governance played an important consideration in investors' willingness to buy Russian stocks. Investing in Russian companies is no longer a complete lottery". 7 In Cheung and Lee (1995) the level of disclosure requirements among US stock exchanges serves as a signalling mechanism that distinguishes between firms of different quality.
observe the price reaction to global effects, Henry (1998) analyzed the impact of market liberalization to firms' performances, and Bekaert and Harvey (1995) studied the decrease in a firm's cost of capital after liberalization but found only small effects.
The driving forces of the distinct reactions to domestic and international public issues coincide with the underlying reasons for the investment preferences biases towards home countries. As highlighted in Kang and Stulz (1997) , and Stulz (1999) , the most important explanations for the home-bias puzzle and its implications for foreign investment, at the firm level, involve explicit and implicit barriers to international investment, as well as departures from the mean-variance analysis. In this paper, we compare between local and foreign listings and take into account the international capital flows, restrictions on foreign exchange transactions (explicit barriers), political risk and information asymmetry between investors (implicit barriers). We find that asymmetries between different types of investor significantly influence the decision of the firms regarding the place to issue. As stock markets become more protected, the firm's probability to issue equity in domestic markets increases by seven percent. Finally, we study the decision on where to issue when a firm performs multiple issues. For the sample of seasoned offers, if a firm issues both locally and abroad, we find that the firm tends to issue earlier in foreign markets and later in domestic markets, supporting the idea that foreign issues are associated with higher fixed costs of additional disclosure requirements and changes in accounting procedures.
The paper is organized in the following way. The data is described in Section 2 where we analyze both the market performance around the offer date and the issue characteristics.
Section 3 presents the analytical framework and the empirical analysis of the firm decision whether to issue equity in the domestic markets or abroad. In Section 4 we analyze the correlation between the issue decision and the market performance around the listing date and Section 5 considers the situation in which the firm performs multiple offers. Finally section 6 concludes and summarizes the main results of the paper. Finally, information on local listing requirements, stock market regulation, institutional procedures and issue costs is provided directly from individual questionnaires sent to the 8 As data permit, we also include some frontier markets. Emerging and frontier markets are defined according to the World Bank characterization. As reported in World Tables 1995, low-income economies are those with an annual GNP per capita of US$725 or less, middle-income US$726-8955, and high-income US$8956 or more -all numbers in 1994 prices. For the purpose of consistency, countries that during the time sample upgraded their rating are retained.
9 Data correspond to transactions of foreign buyers or sellers who deal directly with entities resident in the US. The data do not necessarily indicate the country of beneficial owner or issuer (as in the ADRs case) nor the currency of denomination of the securities. 10 The Institutional Investor index is computed twice a year by 75 to 100 leading international banks. Country risk is rated on a scale of 0-100, where 100 represents the lowest probability of default and 0 the highest. stock exchanges for all the developing countries in the sample.
Evidence on Market Performance around Issuing Date
The evidence on the stock market performance following equity issues announcements generally refer to US-based companies. Asquith and Mullins (1986) , among others, analyze the stock market impact of equity issues for the 1963-1981 period and find that equity issues lead to a decrease in stock price while the reduction depends on the size of the equity offering. Sundaram and Logue (1995) examine the price impact of ADRs over the period finding a decline in the price-to-book value. In a different study, Foerster and Karolyi (1993) study the cross listing of Canadian firms during the 1980s and find that firms' returns are significantly lower subsequent to dual listing. Similarly to the previous studies, we also analyze the stock market responses to equity issue announcements for our sample of firms based in emerging countries. Furthermore, our database allows us to distinguish whether the firms are listing in the local markets or in international markets.
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In order to consider the market impact of an equity issue, we consider a 13-month window around a public issue. This window is centered at the issue date and is wide enough to also include the announcement period. 1213 We define the CAR (cumulative market adjusted return) as:
where R it is the monthly return of firm i and R m i t is the monthly return on the domestic market that firm i belongs to, for month t. For the 13-month period centered at each public issue we compute the monthly CAR, where t 1 is defined as the first month of the 13-month window. We additionally analyze the local stock performance distinguishing between local 11 An international issue corresponds to an issue by a firm based in an emerging market in the US, Europe or in any other developed market. Our database additionally accounts for listings of emerging-country-firms in other emerging countries, but these are a few number and are excluded from the analysis. 12 In our data, the announcement date information is a qualitative measure and is based on the information disclosed by the local stock exchanges responses to the questionnaires that were sent out to them. 13 According to the Bank of New York's Global Offerings of Depositary Receipts: A Transaction Guide (1996), US issue estimates range from about 9-week time for level 1 ADR between establishing a program launch and the start of the pink sheet trading or 14-week for level 2 or 3 and only 7-week for Rule 144A. and foreign issues. The results are presented in Table I and pictured in Figure 1 . We find a negative trend at the 13-month window which is consistent to the general results encountered in the literature. As an example, Forster and Karolyi (1996) find a decrease of 10% in adjusted returns over the first year after ADRs issues. Looking at IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) find a market-adjusted negative return of 23.4% for a three-year period for a sample of 6249 US listings between 1980 and 2001.
The analysis presented in Figure 1 additionally reveal different market reactions whether the firms are issuing locally or abroad suggesting that investors perceive the decision on where to issue as an additional information regarding the value of the firm. In order words, the results imply the existence of a strong correlation between the company's decision on where to issue and the stock market performance. This evidence motivates the present paper and we will analyze the correlation in detail in the next sections.
The Firm Decision on Where to Issue
In this section we analyze the firm's decision on whether to issue equity locally or abroad.
Firms' market performance and investors' reactions are incorporated in the model described in the present section. Later on we use the predictions of the analytical framework to empirically analyze the firm's issue decision.
The Analytical Framework
The distinct stock market performances we observe around the domestic and international listings suggest the firm's decision conveys information regarding its value. In our analytical framework we extend the Kyle (1985) model and analyze the firm's decision so as to determine in what circumstances is the firm choosing to list locally or abroad. The main objective of the analysis is to provide intuition for the driving forces of the firm's decision and the relevant parameters to consider in the empirical analysis to be performed in the next sections.
We consider two types of investors in the market: the local investors and the international investors. We assume that local traders have a perfect knowledge of the value of the firm and that international investors observe the value of the firm with an additional noise. Recent literature, as for example, Albuquerque, Bauer and Schneider (2002) , Kang and Stulz (1997) , and Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) , measure the extent to which domestic investors may have more private information regarding the local stock markets than international traders. The evidence tends to reveal that foreign investors hold securities that are more exposed to international markets and therefore that are more well-known to them.
The modelling of the seasoned issue is composed of two periods: the pre-offer period and the post-offer period. Local and international issues differ by the type and number of investors that participate in each period. For the local issue, only domestic investors are present in the market. That means that both before and after the issues, we have N d informed traders. When the firm performs an international issue, as in the case of the ADRs, additional exposure attracts foreign portfolio investment to the emerging country.
14 In this situation, the pre-offer period has N d informed traders and for the post-offer period has
where N f represents the number of foreign traders. As standard in these type of models we further consider the liquidity traders. The trading equilibrium for both the domestic and foreign issues is characterized in the appendix A. This analytical formulation is similar to Freedman (1995) who analyzes the impact of dual listing, when stock is traded earlier in London and later in NY. In Freedman (1995) , dual trading is actually happening at two different points in time and investors update stock price information in the later period based on past order flows. Similarly, Huddart and Hughes (1999) look at the information cost and the firm's decision on where to issue equity. In their model, investors do not have full information of firm's value, different markets have different disclosure requirements, and informed traders update the firm's value based on the place to issue decision. The trading mechanism at different market segmentation levels is also studied in detail in Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (1998) where domestic and foreign investors gather information at different costs.
Based on the total order flow, the manager maximizes the decision on whether to issue locally or abroad. Once the firm issues in the international markets, it is required to have more information disclosure. This is conveyed in the form of more detailed reports and other restrictions demanded by the developed foreign stock exchanges. Then, while a secondary local issue does not represent an additional fixed cost, we assume that there is an additional cost if the firm chooses to issue abroad.
Firms are sensitive to the number of traders and the asymmetry of information among investors. We assume the firm knows the information structure of the market but does not know its market value. In particular, managers are aware that informed traders will make higher profits as long as there is more uncertainty regarding firm's value, i.e., more opportunities for local traders to take advantage of the liquidity and the less informed (foreign)
traders.
Appendix B presents the decision on where to issue and proposition 5 relates the firm's decision with the level of asymmetry of information between local and foreign investors. The higher the number of traders in the market, the higher the order flow demanded for the firm's assets. At the same time, an increase in the total order flow discloses higher information regarding the firm's value (through the competition among informed traders).
The disclosure of a firm's value diminishes the demand of the individual traders as it decreases the profit from trade of each informed strategic player. Depending whether the information release or the total number of traders prevails, the value of the firm would either increase or decrease.
Overall, we find that if the information asymmetry between investors increase, the value of the firm in the market will benefit from an international issue. Domestic informed traders increase the volume of trading as they now have an additional way to take advantage of the less informed traders. This result assesses the importance of the asymmetry of information and investment flows on the firm's decision on where to issue its securities. In the next section we test the importance of these two driving forces and confront the analytical results with the empirical predictions.
Empirical Analysis
The previous section suggests that the value of the firm is influenced by the number of informed traders and by the differences between the domestic and international investors.
We represent the choice of firm i by the variable Z i , which has value 1 if the firm issues in the international market or 0 if the firm issues domestically. Therefore, given that the firm issues either in the domestic or in the foreign market, the firm's decision is best described by the following probability model:
In order to compute the value of the firm, V i , we focus on the determinants induced by the analytical set up and empirical evidence in section 2. Additionally, we assume a standard linear model of the form:
where the variables x are the instruments that determine a firm's decision and A a matrix of coefficients to be empirically estimated. As explanatory variables we consider the issue size, Amt 15 , which a firm's specific variable. We control for the exposure to local and world risk factors by using, respectively, the correlation between the firm's stock returns and the local market returns (C(F r, Mkt)), and the correlation between the domestic market returns and the world market returns, C(Mkt, US). 16 According to the world portfolio diversification theory, we expect the probability to issue in the international market to increase as the correlation of the firm's market returns to a world market portfolio decreases. We account for the level of foreign market participation by including the US portfolios flows to each emerging country in debt securities (InvDt) and equity (InvEq), scaled by the local market capitalization and averaged over the six-month period that precedes the listing date. 17 Total foreign investment flows to emerging markets are influenced by country risk factors such as local economic and political stability. In the analysis we consider a measure of the country factor by using the country credit index, InstIndx, provided by the Institutional Investor magazine. Finally, we consider region dummies to account for market differences regarding the place where the firm is originated. The market value of the firm is then estimated according to the linear regression:
After substitution in (2) we estimate the coefficients using a logit regression. The results are presented in Table II . We find that a firm's probability to issue abroad increases as the correlation between the firm's stock returns and the local market returns increases, and as the correlation between the local markets and the world market returns diminishes. This result is consistent with the market segmentation hypothesis, suggesting that investors aim at emerging markets stocks for portfolio diversification motives.
Additionally, foreign investment also significantly determines the firm's decision. An increase in the inflow of portfolio investment is associated with an increase in the probability the offer amount. In the next section we relax this assumption. The amount issued is not included in the switching regression but in explaining the expected returns. 16 As world market we use the US market benchmark, and compute the returns from the NYSE Dow Jones stock index.
17 Foreign investment data are collected from the US Treasury Department.
of issuing internationally, which is consistent with what we found in the analytical framework (we proxy the number of foreign investors by the net portfolio investment). Finally, we find that the likenesses of international issues increases as the country credit quality index increases and that foreign issues are associated with higher issue amounts.
In the previous section we argue that the issue decision is also influenced by the differences between the types of investors that participate in the market. This suggests we should include measures of market transparency and information disclosure to foreign traders. One way to perceive the availability of information among investors is to analyze the market practices at each individual country. In particular, we are interested in finding whether foreign investors face information barriers, accounting procedures or trading constraints that prevent them to have access to the same information that is available to local investors. In order to identify the stock markets according to asymmetry between local and international investors we consider the investor protection index which is computed by the World Bank 18 . This index distinguishes stock markets according to the quality of local security exchange publications, international electronic coverage, frequency of regular publications, the existence of market commentaries in english and company brokerage reports, annual disclosure requirements and the presence of multiple stock market indexes for different sector industries. Increasing market transparency is expected to diminish the information gap between domestic and international investors, which corresponds to the minimum level of the investors protection index (in the analytical framework and in figure 2 this corresponds to having σ 2 large).
Similarly, markets with high investor protection index correspond σ 2 small.
As additional market transparency measures, we also consider other IFC indexes such as the Entry Restriction Index and the Accounting Standard Index. Table III presents a summary statistics of the percentage of foreign and domestic issues for a division between low and high quality for the three indexes mentioned and for the 25% quantiles of the market capitalization of the stock exchanges. Fixing the level of asymmetry within markets, we observe that the percentage issued in the domestic market is decreasing with the size of market capitalization. In addition, fixing the market capitalization quartile, we observe that as the market openness increases, the share issued in the domestic markets increases. These results hold whether we consider the investor protection, entry restriction or accounting standards index.
In order to account for the market transparency factor, we estimate the empirical model described in (2) and (4) domestic and international investors, we observe significant differences whether we have local or foreign issues. More specifically, looking at the low investor protection countries we find that the issue amount and correlation between the firm's returns and the local markets are significant and positively correlated. However, the same variables are positive but not significant when we consider the analysis for the high protected countries. The results are different when we consider the country and world market correlations. We find that foreign investment flows and the correlation between the local market and the world market returns significantly determine the probability to issue in international markets for the high protected countries but fail to be statistically significant for the low protection countries.
Our results are consistent with the predictions advanced in the analytical framework.
Figure 3 presents an empirical estimation of the results of the model, as observed in figure   2 . We proxy the number of foreign investors using the net portfolio investment in equity scaled by the local market capitalization. Additionally, the level of asymmetry of information between local and foreign investors is proxied by the investor protection index. In Figure   3 we plot the estimated probabilities of issuance in foreign markets obtained from the logit regressions, as a function of the foreign investment in equity. Furthermore, we evaluate the probability to issue abroad at the mean of the explanatory variables in both logit regressions.
We find that as we change from the low level of investor protection to the high level of investor protection, the probability to issue in an international developed stock market decreases by seven percent.
The Market Reaction to the Issue Decision
The analysis of the firm's decision performed in the previous section suggests that the returns on market prices are correlated with the firm's choice. In the present section we consider the different reactions to domestic and foreign issues and incorporate firm's listing decision in the analysis of market returns.
Emerging and developed stock markets differ with respect to admission requirements, disclosure and trading procedures 20 . Once the firm lists in an international market, it is incurring in additional costs, committing to international accounting procedures and more demanding information disclosure requirements. Issuing costs in international markets represent between 10% and 54% more than the local emerging markets listing costs. In Cheung and Lee (1995), the level of market disclosure serves as a signalling mechanism that allows firms to differentiate themselves in the global financial market. The intuition is also similar to Chaplinsky and Hansen (1992) who observe that unanticipated debt offers have a negative effect on price reactions reinforcing the existence of asymmetry of information between investors. This means that the choice of a foreign stock exchange becomes one of balancing the benefits of better pricing against greater listings costs.
Looking at the factors that determine the cross-sectional differences in market adjusted returns, Fama and French (1992) observe that expected returns are significantly determined by the price-to-book value and the market capitalization of firms. Using a similar empirical set up as the one suggested in Fama and French (1992) , we consider the price-to-book value (P BV ) and the variables introduced in the previous section, namely, the Institutional Index (InstIndx), the issue amount (Amt), the correlation between the firm's returns 20 See, for example, Biddle and Saudagaran (1995) for a summary of the major differences between stock exchanges disclosures, listing costs, regulatory responses and trading costs. and local markets (C(F r, Mkt)), the correlation between local markets and world markets (C(Mkt, US)), and dummies for region effects. Assuming that there is correlation between the variables that explain the adjusted returns and the listing decision of the firm, the empirical modeled reduces to:
where Z i is defined as before: value 1 in the case the firm i issues abroad and 0 in the case of a domestic issue. As the market's reaction is affected by the place where the firm decides to issue its securities, the model in (5) should be replaced by the following system of regressions:
where we assume that the disturbances u i,int and u i,dom are correlated and normally distributed with variances σ 2 int and σ 2 dom , respectively. Direct OLS for the expected return model in (6) is not appropriate because the regressions fail to reflect the presence of the self-selection of the firm's place to issue decision. This happens because the conditional means of the error terms in the adjusted return equations are not zero and not constant for all the observations:
where the f and F are the standard normal density functions. In order to analyze the price reaction effect while recognizing the endogenous nature of a firm's decision and fully account for the problem of self-selection, we consider a two-stage switching regression model with endogenous switching. At the first stage a firm's decision to issue in international markets is determined using a probit in a similar way to what was done in the previous section. At the second stage, we incorporate the self-selection estimation from the first stage into the expected return equations so as to estimate regressions (6) by OLS. The corrected adjusted returns equations are reduced to:
In the switching regression model, if the same variables that explain the probit are used in the regression, the selfselection bias would not be evaluated. In order to test for the reliability of the estimated coefficients we consider two regression models at the second stage of the empirical model.
Firstly, adjusted returns are regressed on all the variables presented in (5). Secondly, we regress expected returns on the protection index (discussed in the previous section), amount issued, PBV, regional dummies and the selection variable. Table V presents the estimation of the two models. Our results are in accordance with Fama and French (1992) in finding a significant negative relation between market-to-book value and security returns. However, the negative effect of the PBV coefficient differs according to the place where a firm decides to issue its securities.
In the return regression (8) we have Z i,dom = Z i,int . In order to test for the differences between regressors and analyze the different impact of the risk factors on the cross-sectional regressions for domestic an international issues, we define Z i = Z i,dom = Z i,int and estimate the two equations in (8) simultaneously as:
The test for the differences between coefficients γ for and γ dom in system (8) is performed by the analysis of the significance of the estimation of the coefficient γ for −γ dom in the regression (9). The results for this test are also presented in table V. We find that the impact of the risk factors on returns estimated by Fama and French (1992) significantly differs according to the place of issuance (the t-test associated with γ for − γ dom for the PBV variable is 2.769 for Model 1 and 2.827 for Model 2). The comparison of the risk premia across the cross-sectional differences in returns, as measured by the market-to-book value, reveals that domestic issues have a stronger negative effect than the international issues. The lower risk premium associated with international issues suggests that foreign public offerings represent a high quality signal corresponding the firm's ability to meet the higher demanding disclosure requirements imposed by the international stock markets. This result holds for both models presented in the analysis.
In addition, the issue amount has a negative effect in returns, but this result just holds for local issues. If the firm issues abroad, we find a positive effect of the amount issued on the adjusted returns. Looking at the country index factors, the results are constistent to the ones found in the logit estimates. If the country index increases, the probability to issue abroad increases and at the second stage the adjusted returns increase.
From model 2, we find that the protection index estimates (which accounts for the asymmetry of information between domestic and foreign investors) supports the evidence found in the previous section. We observe that the investor protection index has a negative (positive) effect on the adjusted returns for the international (domestic). A decrease in the asymmetry of information between domestic and foreign investors is in accordance with an decrease in the adjusted returns.
Finally, 
Multiple Issues
We have previously observed that firms have to balance the additional listings costs of international markets issues with the extra exposure to other foreign investors. That suggests that if we have firms performing multiple issues, both in domestic and international markets, one should ask, when should be right moment to issue abroad. In this section we address this question by considering a dynamic empirical model of the firm´s decision. In order to allow for a richer dynamic pattern of issues, we consider both equity and debt issues and compute the probability that the firm decides to issue in international markets based on the past issuing decisions of the firm.
We define a probability model where the dependent variable, Z i , is defined as before:
value 1 if the firm issues internationally and 0 if the firm performs a domestic issue. As explanatory variables we introduce four discrete variables that account for the firm's past decisions: preveqt has value 1 if the firm has issued equity before and 0 otherwise; prevdbt has value 1 if the firm had a debt issue previously and 0 otherwise, prevf rg has value 1 if the firm had issued abroad before and 0 otherwise; and prevdom with value 1 if the firm had a domestic issue and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, we control for the country where the firm originates and consider the region dummies: Asia and Europe. Finally we consider the dummy debt_equity which has value 1 if the current issue is equity and 0 if debt. The empirical model resumes to:
The logit estimations are separately performed for each multiple issue and are presented in table VII. More specifically, in the first column, we find the estimates of the previous model for the firm's second issue. The following three columns represent the results for the firm's 3rd, 4th and 5th issues. The last column shows the results of the estimates for the firm's 6th or higher order issues that the firm performs during the sample period.
Looking at the first two variables preveqty and prevdebt we find that, independently of whether firms issue debt or equity, they tend to issue earlier abroad and later in the domestic markets. The international timing between debt and equity does not seem to play a significant role. However, an inspection at the estimates of debt_eqty observes that international markets are associated with debt issues while local market with equity issues.
If the firm performs an equity issue in international markets, it tends to perform the issue earlier in time. From table VII we observe that Asian issues are biased toward domestic issues when compared to the Latin American ones. The strong component of the debt issues explains the sign of the Asian dummy variable.
Investors look at a subsequent offer as an additional market risk incurred by the firm.
As observed in Fama and French (1992) and commented in previous sections of this paper, the PBV can be perceived as a risk factor in the market return analysis. As observed by Logue and Sundaram (1996) , the price-to-book value can be a proxy for the cost of equity.
Given an expected growth in book value, when market prices increase, PBV increases and the cost of equity decreases. Therefore, the variation of the PBV with the number of issues measures how the cost of capital changes with the number of issues. Under the assumption that multiple issues increase firm's risk, we expect that PBV to decrease with the number of issues.
In table VIII we present the analysis of the PBV for each multiple issue. We compute the average of the PBV value of the underlying stock for the six months in the pre-issue period, for each multiple issue. Further, we distinguish between domestic and international issues.
If firm's growth rates change across industries, the PBV changes accordingly and the simple averages of PBV across all firms are no longer valuable measures of the cost of issue.
In order to eliminate this problem we consider three alternatives: control for country, sector and both country and sector.
In order to control for country factor we compute the ratio:
In the expression P BV i is collected from the Emerging Markets Database, P BV c is aggregated across all securities trading in the stock market. If the local market as N securities, the P BV c is calculated according to the expression:
In order to control for sector, we compute the ratio:
where we compute the P BV s for each of the following seven sectors: agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, wholesale and retail, finance insurance and real estate, services.
Finally we control for the country and sector. Table VIII and figures 4 and 5 present the results. In figure 4 we adjust by country factors and in figure 5 both country and sector.
We find a negative relation between the PBV and the number of issues. In other words, the issue costs increase with the number of the subsequent offers. Looking across the places of issuance, the significant decrease in PBV for domestic issues suggests that local stock markets react more negatively to multiple offers than international markets.
Conclusion
Foreign markets allow firms based in emerging countries to reach a broader range of investment opportunities and added number of investors. However, foreign issues also require additional fees. Issuance costs are 10% to 54% higher in the foreign markets than locally, where the difference tends to vary within countries rather than with the quality of firms.
In the present paper, we used a sample of 26 emerging countries and collected data on domestic and international public offers from January 1988 to August 1998. We find that for stock markets at an early stage of development, the firm's choice between domestic and foreign issues depends almost exclusively on the firm's specific characteristics. As markets open to outside investors, foreign investment inflows and the correlation between the local markets and the world market portfolio become significant factors in explaining the firm's decision on where to issue its securities. The probability of issuing in international markets increases as the correlation between the firm's stock returns and the local market returns increases and the correlation between the local market returns and the US market returns decreases. This evidence strongly supports the well-documented investments motives for portfolio diversification.
In the analytical framework the choice between domestic and international public issues is influenced by information differences across investors. We proxy the asymmetry of information in local emerging markets using indexes that control for investor protection, accounting standards and entry restriction and provide an empirical test for the analytical set up. The empirical analysis are consistent with the analytical simulations. We observe that as the asymmetry of information between international and domestic investors decreases and inflows of foreign investment increase, the firm's probability of issuing in domestic markets increases.
Additionally, we find that the risk premium is strongly correlated with market-to-book value. These findings are consistent with results obtained in Fama and French (1992) . However, we observe different market reactions to domestic and international issues suggesting that expected returns at announcement are correlated to the firm's decision on where to issue.
We estimate a switching regression model to explain adjusted returns at the announcement of a public offer where the endogenous switching assessed the firm's choice on where to issue. We find a lower risk premium associated with international issues. This result suggests that, although a firm faces additional listings costs in international markets, foreign public offerings are also associated with a signal of high quality that reflects the firm's ability to meet the higher demanding disclosure requirements of international stock markets.
Finally, we find that a firm that issues both locally and abroad tends to issue earlier in foreign markets and later in domestic stock markets. International issues are associated with higher fixed costs of additional disclosure requirements and changes in accounting procedures suggesting that firms issue later in domestic markets decreasing the average costs of issuance.
Appendix A: Market Equilibrium for Domestic and Foreign Issues
The price is assumed to correspond to the market efficient condition in the sense that most of the information should be incorporated in the prices. In the one period case this means that prices should be proportional to the order flow. In the two period case that means that prices should include information of the past and current period order flow.
Defining w 1 as the total order flow at period 1 and w 2 as the total order flow at period 2, the equilibrium price schemes are given, respectively, by p 1 = E (v)+λ 1 w 1 and p 2 = p 1 +λ 2 w 2 .
Based on the prices, the informed traders set their demands so as to maximize the profits from trade. In each period, informed traders maximize their demands for current and future periods based on past decisions and order flows. Although prices are specified in the previous way, we have no reason to expect that informed traders do not update their demands between periods.
Under these assumptions, the dynamic linear equilibrium is shown in Kyle (1985) to be a recursive equilibrium. In order to solve we will consider first the second period and later the first period so as to determine the equilibrium. Equilibrium characterization is based on the definition of the volume trade, price variance, trading costs and the informativeness of the price. The analysis of the market's trading equilibrium assumes the firm's decision as given (appendix B considers the firm's decision). We first describe the domestic issue market equilibrium and finally the international issue.
A.1 Domestic Issue
If we have a domestic issue, the number of informed traders is the same in the two periods. In this framework, domestic informed traders face a similar trading framework in both periods.
The incentives to trade in the second period are perceived as another opportunity for them to take advantage from the liquidity traders or from eventual errors market makers could have made when setting up the price mechanism in period 1.
Informed traders plan their demand strategies at the beginning of the first period and update their decisions in the second period. Starting backwards, informed traders' demand in the second period is assumed to be of the form:
. The optimal demand in period 2 is the solution of the problem:
and the solution is:
For the first period, the informed trader demand is of the form: (v) ) and the optimal demand is the solution of the problem:
which leads to:
The order flows in period 1 and 2 are given by the sum of the market maker, informed and liquidity traders. Based on the order flow, the market maker will set prices. Market equilibrium is characterized by the parameters λ i and β i for periods 1 and 2.
A.2 International Issue
For the international issue, the number of foreign investors will vary between periods. At the announcement period, there will only exist informed traders from the domestic countries. In the trading period, firms start to trade in the foreign exchange. In the model, that means that foreign traders are now also informed. Information asymmetries between investors will induce domestic and foreign traders to have different precision regarding a firm's true value.
Market equilibrium is studied starting from the second period and then the first period, the announcement period.
A.2.1 Second Period -Trading period
In the second period, firms are subject to different trading protocols, as firms trade in the domestic and/or international markets. Therefore, for the post-issue period, differences between domestic and international issues are the result of distinct trading costs. In the model, the foreign issue is reduced to the case of the domestic issue when the number of foreign informed traders is zero. The domestic informed trader updates the trading strategy he plans at the announcement period. In this way, he takes advantage of the liquidity traders and eventual errors in the price settled by the market maker in period one.
According to the price mechanism defined above, the domestic informed trader demand in period 2 is defined as:
where β d 2 is a constant. The informed trader does not have the same information advantage as the domestic one. Rather, he observes a firm's true value with a noise we define by θ.
The international informed trader demand for securities is defined as:
where the signal observed by the international trader is θ = v + ε, where ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ε ). Note that both v and E (v |θ ) have the same mean, but we have that: var (v) ≥ var (v |θ ). This means that the foreign trader has an information advantage over the liquidity traders and an information disadvantage over the domestic informed traders. Finally, the liquidity traders are assumed to have a demand given by:
The order flow in the second period is given by:
Proposition 1
The domestic informed trader optimal demand in the trading period is given by:
Outline of the Proof. In the second period, the domestic informed trader will solve the following problem:
We substitute for the prices, the number of informed traders in the market in the second period and u 2 , the demand of the second period liquidity traders.
Looking at the foreign informed trader, we will have:
Proposition 2 The foreign trader optimal demand will be given by
Outline of the Proof. The foreign trader will solve the problem:
and the demand expression will follow after substitution for the price expressions and the order flow in period one.
A.2.2 First Period -Announcement Period
In period 1, the informed trader will solve the problem conditioned on the expected demand for the second period:
Proposition 3 The optimal demand of the informed trader in period 1 is given by:
Outline of the Proof. In the first period, the domestic trader is the only type of informed trader in the market. The informed trader's problem is given by:
If we assume the price to be a linear function of the order flow and each informed trader to submit a linear pricing strategy, market equilibrium will be characterized by the parameters, λ 1 , λ 2 , β 1 , β 2f , and β 2d . If the firm issues in the domestic market, there are no foreign informed traders. Traders' maximization problems are defined in a similar way and the equilibrium would be characterized by the parameters: λ 1 , λ 2 , β 1 , β 2 .
Outline of the Proof. The firm's problem is to determine both the place and the amount to issue. Although managers can not observe the actual demand of the traders, they observe the order flow. Firm's problem is reduced to:
where w i 1 ,w i 2 represent the order flow for market i and period 1 (announcement) and 2 (trading) respectively. Solving first for the optimal amount, we find that the firm, in the market i, issues the optimal amount given by:
The firm's place to issue decision is determined as we compare the firm's unconditional expected value for the domestic and international issue at the end of period 2.
Proposition 5 As the uncertainty advantage of the domestic traders over the international traders decreases, σ 2 ε → 0, the firm chooses to issue in the domestic market. As the informational advantage of the domestic traders over the international traders increases, σ 2 ε → ∞, firm chooses to issue in international market.
Proof. The terminal value of the firm after issue at market i = f, d is given by:
fter algebraic transformation we have:
and also:
where we define:
The expression for B for the domestic and international issues is reduced to: We want to compare the value of the firm in each of the two situations. After comparing the expressions above for the domestic and international issue situation, the differences between domestic and international issues reduce to comparison between the value of the expression A for the domestic and international issues. For the sake of simplification we just compare the expression for A.
Considering first the case where σ 2 ε → 0, and after substitution for the covariances and variances, and reducing the expressions in terms of the domestic issues, and noting that as the information disadvantage of the informed traders is decreasing, domestic and international informed traders will have the same behavior. In this case, as σ
and for the domestic issue we have
Now, comparing the domestic and international expressions, we observe that the expression A f is increasing in N f which, after comparing with the expression A d also means that we
Now, for the expression B we have that:
and observe that we have that cov (v, w 2 ) int ≥ cov (v, w 2 ) dom and we can observe that
In order to get the result we need to prove that we have the above expression is decreasing with A and with B. In order to derive this result note that E (E (v |w i , w 
and for the domestic issue situation we have also:
comparing the two expressions we observe that A f is decreasing in N f and therefore we have
Now for the expression B we have:
and comparing to the expression for the domestic case we have cov (v, Cumulative Average Returns
The figure represents the average of the cumulative returns around the issue date corresponding to the tabular representation of Table I . It compares the price reaction for domestic and international issues. 
Simulation of the Theoretical Prediction of Firm's Market Value
In the graph we compute the result of the simulation of the theoretical model for V foreign -V domestic as a function of the number of foreign informed traders in the market. In the picture we control for different levels of the asymmetry of information between foreign and domestic investors σ ε 2 (will increase with the asymmetry between local and foreign investors) and we use σ ε 2 =5, σ ε 2 =10 and σ ε 2 =50. In the figure, for positive values the firm will issue in the international markets and for negative values will issue in the domestic markets. Table II 
Logit of Place to Issue Decision on Market Performance
For the choice on where to issue (dependent variable), the value 1 corresponds to foreign issues and the value 0 to domestic issues. Regarding the independent variables, the institutional index is published twice a year by the Institutional Investor magazine. Countries are ranked on a 1-100 scale, where 100 corresponds to the less risky country. Each monthly return correlation is computed considering returns from the previous 12-month period. US returns are computed from the Dow Jones Industrial Average index. The amount issued is include as we consider the firm first chooses where to issue and later the size of the issue. Foreign investment data are collected from the US Treasury Department. 
Estimated Probabilities from the Logit Regression
The figure presents the empirical prediction from the logit estimation, for each level of investor protection index. The probability of issuing abroad is plotted as a function of the portfolio investment on equity. In the figure, we signal the sample mean of the investment on equity for each investor protection type. 
Estimated Probabilities from Logit
The table presents the t-test for the estimation of the coefficients γ for -γ dom , i.e., the analysis of the significance of which γ for and γ dom coeffcients are different.
The adjusted return variable corresponds to the cumulative adjusted return for the month of trading period. The selection variable is the for the self-selection variable estimated in the probit regression. 
Figure 4 Analysis of the PBV for Multiple Issues -Control By Country
Presents the average of the PBV with the number of issues as we control for country factors. This figure corresponds to the tabular representation in table VIII.
Figure 5 Analysis of the PBV for Multiple Issues -Control By Country and Sector
Presents the average of the PBV with the number of issues as we control for country and sector factors. The values in this figure correspond to the tabular representation in Table VIII . 
